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The organizations’ performance measured in various dimensions and one of the tricky oil of 
efficiency shareholders wealth maximization and this will create a momentum of growth 
and development. In line with this focus the impact of dividend decision is going to be 
verified in this paper using payout ratio, retention ratio, capital gain, dividend yield, and 
dividend irrelevance. While conceptualizing this, a case model has constructed in every 
estimation angle and the run of the outcomes helps the business and research network to 
include dividend decision measurement in the process of organization valuation.  





The power of informative dividends to serve as a substitute for additional financial markets is 
particularly notable (Hakanson, Nils, H, 1982). Whether to pay or not to pay dividends has been 
addressed from the perspectives of the welfare implications to the owner (the investors) to render 
the owner requirements in terms of incentive schemes which is equally important (Harkavy, 
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Oscar, 1953). Dividend policy has information content in that knowledge that a firm has reduce 
dividends improves current earnings to predict future earnings (Harry et.al. 1992). It is argued 
that regular dividends have become less flexible and less responsive to earnings (Leary & 
Michaely, 2011; Skinner, 2008). In addition, the “consensus [view] in the literature” is that 
repurchases are gradually replacing dividends as the dominant payout channel (Bonaimé et 
al., 2020, p. 28). Several studies argue that the evolution of payout policy internationally is 
broadly similar to that in the United States (Farre‐Mensa et al., 2014; Fatemi & Bildik, 2012; von 
Eije & Megginson, 2008). As the current paper shows with models and interpretations of 
dividend policy in terms of payout, retention, yield, capital gains and irrelevance. Whereas 
dividends pay out ongoing or permanent cash flows (Fama & French, 2001; Guay & 
Harford, 2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000; Lie, 2000). Based on the past behavior the future trends 
are predicted and investment suggestions are made based on such predictions of trend changes, 
the timing of an investment when to buy or sell is facilitated by a study of that information 
(Govindasamy, et.al. 2018). However, Fenn and Liang (2001) and Kahle (2002). Grullon and 
Michaely (2002) find that firms increasingly initiate payout via repurchases, and that 
lower‐than‐expected dividend yields are associated with higher repurchase yields. Banyi et al. 
(2008); the amounts spent on buying back shares are not offset by proceeds from concurrent 
share issues. Fama and French (2001), based on the arguments that the decision to pay dividends 
is negatively related to investment opportunities, and positively related to profitability and size. 
The management might encourage investor’s satisfaction survey at regular intervals to improve 
the investor’s satisfaction (Govindasamy, Viswanathan, E. 2015). The measures of risk, 
and Retained equity/Assets, are introduced, respectively, by Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) and 
DeAngelo et al. (2006). Higher risk increases the expected cost of the future commitment to pay 
that is implied by regular dividends. Retained equity is a proxy for company maturity, and 
dividend payment is positively related to maturity according to the life‐cycle theory.  David et.al. 
(2021) Fund providers and investors, who should consider accounting information quality in 
order to reach a better investment decision,. Jie, Xuan et.al. (2021) Given investors’ aversion to 
dividend cuts, we predict that firms with higher resource adjustment costs and stickier costs pay 
lower dividends than their peers because they are less able to sustain any higher level of dividend 
payouts in the future. We find evidence consistent with this prediction.   
All investors’ are looking decent dividend and capital gain as ROI for their investments. In 
order to satisfy investors’ companies adopt various strategies in announcing and committing 
dividend payout to their equity capital providers. It is to characterize as wealth creation is a 
measure of income and also it is an imperative idea to stabilize capital the firm needs a clean 
chit dividend policy in force and vis-à-vis signify the investors through a sizable capital 
appreciation out of our wealth creation strategy. At the outset of this process is subject the 
competitors’ moves in the market and also hedge the risk and win in the market as an 
ultimate goal of every firm. Hence, the tricky position of finance manager to declare 
dividend, assure capital appreciation, manage the prevailing market competition and 
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maintain retained earnings for future growth of the firm sensitizes the overall performance 
of the firm. The following models of dividend payouts help them to neutralize and provides 
strength to business operational efficiency. 
 
1. PAYOUT RATIO 
Ordinarily, a firm would utilize its dividend strategy to seek after its target of augmenting its 
investors' return with the goal that the estimation of their venture is boosted. Investors return 
comprises of profits and capital additions. Dividend strategy straightforwardly impacts these 
two parts of return. Regardless of whether dividends are not proclaimed however held in the 
firm, the investors' riches or return would go up. We will look at different proportions which 
sway our Company’s dividend strategy  
 
Let us currently take a glance at this with a model: Firms A and B has value capital of 
Rs.100. Let us expect both the organizations produce 25% income consistently. Let us 
expect that Firm A pronounces 50 percent of dividend each year and firm B declares just 
25% dividend each year.  
Table -1; Firm-A – Earnings and Payout 
Firm / Year Equity 25% earnings 50% Dividend 
1 100.00 25.00 12.50 
2 112.50 28.13 14.06 
3 126.56 31.64 15.82 
4 142.38 35.60 17.80 
5 160.18 40.05 20.02 
6 180.20 45.05 22.53 
7 202.73 50.68 25.34 
8 228.07 57.02 28.51 
9 256.58 64.14 32.07 
10 288.65 72.16 36.08 
11 324.73 81.18 40.59 
12 365.32 91.33 45.67 
13 410.99 102.75 51.37 
14 462.36 115.59 57.80 
15 520.16 130.04 65.02 
Total dividend received by the investors 485.18 
 
Table-2; Firm-B – Earnings and Payout 
Firm / Year Equity 25% earnings 25% Dividend 
1 100.00 25.00 6.25 
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2 118.75 29.69 7.42 
3 141.02 35.25 8.81 
4 167.46 41.86 10.47 
5 198.85 49.71 12.43 
6 236.14 59.03 14.76 
7 280.42 70.10 17.53 
8 332.99 83.25 20.81 
9 395.43 98.86 24.71 
10 469.57 117.39 29.35 
11 557.62 139.40 34.85 
12 662.17 165.54 41.39 
13 786.33 196.58 49.15 
14 933.76 233.44 58.36 
15 1108.84 277.21 69.30 
Total dividend received by the investors 405.58 
 
In the event that you take a glance at the profits (sitting above the premium on the dividend 
got by method of money) to the investors of firms A and B toward the finish of 15 years, the 
accompanying position will arise on Rs.100 put resources into each firm. On account of low 
dividend Payout Company, indeed from the year 14 onwards, the quantum of dividend paid 
has really surpassed the high profit payout organization. On the off chance that you take a 
glance at the market esteem, a low payout firm will bring about a higher share price in the 
market since it builds profit development.  
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Fig-2: Firm B – 25% Earnings and 25% Dividend 
 
Vulnerability encompassing future organization productivity drives certain investors to 
incline toward the sureness of current dividends. Investors lean toward "enormous" 
dividends. Investors don't care to make "hand crafted" dividends, yet incline toward the 
organization to appropriate them straightforwardly.  
 
Capital gains taxes are conceded until the real offer of sale of stock. This makes a planning 
choice. Capital gains are liked to dividends, all that else equivalent. In this way, high 
dividend yielding stocks should sell at a markdown value to create a higher before-tax pace 
of return. Certain institutional investors pay no tax. 
 
Dividends are burdened in terms of charging tax more intensely than capital additions, so 
before-tax returns ought to be higher for high dividend - paying firms. Experimental 
outcomes are blended - as of late the proof is generally predictable with dividend 
nonpartisanship.  
 
2. RETENTION RATIO 
Table-3; Firm – A – Retention Ratio 
Firm / Year Equity 25% earnings 50% Dividend Retained Earnings 
1 100.00 25.00 12.50 12.50 
2 112.50 28.13 14.06 14.06 
3 126.56 31.64 15.82 15.82 
4 142.38 35.60 17.80 17.80 
5 160.18 40.05 20.02 20.02 
6 180.20 45.05 22.53 22.53 
7 202.73 50.68 25.34 25.34 
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9 256.58 64.14 32.07 32.07 
10 288.65 72.16 36.08 36.08 
11 324.73 81.18 40.59 40.59 
12 365.32 91.33 45.67 45.67 
13 410.99 102.75 51.37 51.37 
14 462.36 115.59 57.80 57.80 
15 520.16 130.04 65.02 65.02 
Total dividend received by the investors 485.18  
 
Table-4; Firm – B – Retention Ratio 
Firm / Year Equity 25% earnings 25% Dividend Retained Earnings 
1 100.00 25.00 6.25 18.75 
2 118.75 29.69 7.42 22.27 
3 141.02 35.25 8.81 26.44 
4 167.46 41.86 10.47 31.40 
5 198.85 49.71 12.43 37.29 
6 236.14 59.03 14.76 44.28 
7 280.42 70.10 17.53 52.58 
8 332.99 83.25 20.81 62.44 
9 395.43 98.86 24.71 74.14 
10 469.57 117.39 29.35 88.04 
11 557.62 139.40 34.85 104.55 
12 662.17 165.54 41.39 124.16 
13 786.33 196.58 49.15 147.44 
14 933.76 233.44 58.36 175.08 
15 1108.84 277.21 69.30 207.91 
Total dividend received by the investors 405.58   
Retention portion is only the opposite of the payout proportion. As we have seen over, a low 
payout (and subsequently a high retention) strategy will create a potential higher dividend 
declaration (and along these lines higher share price in the secondary market prompting 
colossal capital additions) since it expands income development.  
 
3. CAPITAL GAINS  
Investors of development and growth organizations will understand their return generally as 
capital increases. Typically such development organizations will have expanding profit quite 
a long time after year however their payout proportion may not be extremely high. Their 
retention proportion will consequently be higher. Investors in such organizations will 
harvest capital additions in the later years. Notwithstanding, the effect of dividend strategy 
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(high or low payout with low or high retention proportion) isn't exceptionally basic. Such 
capital increases will bring about the inaccessible future and subsequently numerous 
investors may think about them as questionable.  
 
Table – 5; Capital Gain Analysis 
Particulars Firm X Firm Y 
Total dividend income Rs.485.18 Rs.405.58 
Total capital gain (over 
the original investment amount of Rs.100) 
Rs.520.16 Rs.1,108.84 
Total income Rs.1005.34 Rs.1,514.42 
 
4. DIVIDEND YIELD 
The dividend yield is the investors ROI which has arrived as the dividends per share divided 
by the market price per share. If equity investment of Rs.100 crores with the face of each 
share Rs.10, the expenses committed for the capital is 12%, growth rate of share price is 
continually consistently every year at 3% and the return is 25%. The accompanying model 
portrays the dividend yield when the dividend payouts are 25 percent and 50 percent and the 
results in terms of market value of shares with the due assumptions’ employed as 
recommended by Walter’s and Gorden’s dividend decision styles. 
 
Table-6; Firm - A; 25% Earnings; 50% Dividend Payout and Dividend Yield 
 
Dividend Per share 
(A) 










1.25 19.10 13.89 0.065 0.090 
 
1.41 20.40 15.63 0.069 0.090 
 
1.58 21.86 17.58 0.072 0.090 
 
1.78 23.51 19.78 0.076 0.090 
 
2.00 25.37 22.25 0.079 0.090 
 
2.25 27.45 25.03 0.082 0.090 
 
2.53 29.80 28.16 0.085 0.090 
 
2.85 32.44 31.68 0.088 0.090 
 
3.21 35.41 35.64 0.091 0.090 
 
3.61 38.75 40.09 0.093 0.090 
 
4.06 42.51 45.10 0.095 0.090 
 
4.57 46.74 50.74 0.098 0.090 
 
5.14 51.49 57.08 0.100 0.090 
 
5.78 56.84 64.22 0.102 0.090 
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Fig-3: Firm A – Dividend Payout and Dividend Yield 
 
Table-7; Firm A; 25% Earnings; 25% Dividend Payout and Dividend Yield 
 
Dividend Per share 
(A) 










0.63 18.23 6.94 0.034 0.090 
 
0.74 19.21 8.25 0.039 0.090 
 
0.88 20.37 9.79 0.043 0.090 
 
1.05 21.74 11.63 0.048 0.090 
 
1.24 23.38 13.81 0.053 0.090 
 
1.48 25.32 16.40 0.058 0.090 
 
1.75 27.63 19.47 0.063 0.090 
 
2.08 30.36 23.12 0.069 0.090 
 
2.47 33.62 27.46 0.074 0.090 
 
2.93 37.48 32.61 0.078 0.090 
 
3.49 42.06 38.72 0.083 0.090 
 
4.14 47.51 45.98 0.087 0.090 
 
4.91 53.98 54.61 0.091 0.090 
 
5.84 61.65 64.84 0.095 0.090 
 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Dividend Per share (A)
Dividend Per share (A) Earning
Pershare (AA)
Market Price Per Share
Walter's Model (B)
Market Price Per Share
Gordon's Model (C)
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Fig-4: Firm B – Dividend Payout and Dividend Yield 
 
5. DIVIDEND IMMATERIALITY HYPOTHESIS 
In the first case, when the firm pays dividends, shareholders get cash in their hands but the 
firm’s cash balance gets reduced. Though the shareholders gain in the form of such 
dividends, they lose in the form of their claims on the cash assets of the firm. This can be 
seen as an exchange of abundance of the investor starting with one portfolio then onto the 
next. Hence there is no net addition or deficit. In an ideal economic situation, this won't 
influence the estimation of the firm.  
 
In the subsequent one, the issue of new shares to finance dividend payments brings about 
two transactions – existing investors gets money as dividends and the new investors part 
with their money to the organization in return for new shares. The current investors endure 
an equivalent measure of capital misfortune since the estimation of their case on firm's 
resources gets diminished. The new investors increase new shares at a reasonable cost for 
every share. The reasonable cost per share is the share price before the payment of dividends 
less dividend per share to the existing investors. The existing investors move a piece of their 
claim on the firm to the new investors in return for money. Subsequently there is no increase 
or misfortune. Since these two exchanges are reasonable, the estimation of the firm value 
will stay unaffected.  
 
In the third situation, if the firm doesn't deliver dividend, the investor can at present make 
money to address his issues by selling a section or entire of his shares at the market price in 
the stock trade. The investor will have lesser number of shares as he has traded a piece of his 
holdings on the firm to the new investor in return for money. The net impact is the 
equivalent by and by. The transaction is a reasonable one as there is no increase or 
misfortune. The estimation of the firm value will stay unaffected.  
 
This dividend immateriality hypothesis passes by the name Miller – Modigliani (MM) 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Dividend Per share (A)
Dividend Per share (A) Earning
Pershare (AA)
Market Price Per Share Walter's
Model (B)
Market Price Per Share
Gordon's Model (C)
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estimation of a firm relies entirely upon its profit power and isn't affected by the way in 
which its income are part among dividends and retained earnings. This view is 
communicated as the MM – Dividend Irrelevance hypothesis and is advanced in their 
acclaimed 1961 examination work – Dividend strategy, development and the valuation of 
offers – in the Journal of Business Vol 34 (Oct 1961). In this work, Miller and Modigliani 
worked out their contention on the accompanying assumptions: capital markets are perfect 
and investors are rational: data is unreservedly accessible, transactions are unconstrained, 
momentary, and costless; securities are divisible and no one particular investor can influence 
market prices. Floatation costs are nil and unimportant. Investment and dividend decisions 
are autonomous. 
 
5.1 DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE 
Assumptions of dividend irrelevance as per Miller Modigliani Proposition with suitable model; 
There are no transactions costs associated with converting price appreciation into cash, by selling 
stock. If this were not true, investors who need cash urgently might prefer to receive dividends. 
Firms that pay too much in dividends can issue stock, again with no flotation or transactions 
costs, to take on good projects. There is also an implicit assumption that this stock is fairly 
priced. The investment decisions of the firm are unaffected by its dividend decisions and the 
firms operating cash flows are the same no matter which dividend policy is adopted. Managers of 
firms that pay too little in dividends do not waste the cash pursuing their own interests (i.e., 
managers with large free cash flows do not use them to take on bad projects). Under these 
assumptions, neither the firms paying the dividends nor the stockholders receiving them will be 
adversely affected by firms paying either too little or too much in dividends. A Proof of 
Dividend Irrelevance: To provide a formal proof of irrelevance, assume that M/s.ABC Ltd 
unlevered manufacturing firm manufacturing, has a net operating income with due consideration 
of tax 20%, share price growth rate 5%, Cost of Capital 15%, Free Flow of Cash Inflow, Value 
of the firm and Value of Existing Shareholders. Further, assume that this firm has net capital 
expenditure needs (capital expenditures in excess of depreciation) and that there are 1 crore 
shares outstanding. Finally, assume that this firm pays out residual cash flows as dividends each 
year.  
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Interpretation:  If dividends are, in fact, irrelevant, firms are spending a great deal of time 
pondering an issue about which their stockholders are indifferent. A number of strong 
implications emerge from this proposition. Among them, the value of equity in a firm should not 
change as its dividend policy changes. This does not imply that the price per share will be 




A firm operating in a perfect or ideal capital market conditions may commonly confront the 
dilemmas as briefed above with regard to payment of dividends. The firm has sufficient cash 
to pay dividends but such payments may erode its cash balance. The firm needs mode 
liquidity to honor dividend payments and to meets its installment payments of dividend 
payouts, the firm may need to issue to new offers. The firm does not pay dividends, but 
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shareholders expect and need cash. when the firm delivers profits, investors get money in 
their fold however the company’s cash balance gets decreased. To substantiate the 
information passed in the above models will be gearing us to dividend policy related 
decisions and maximize investors (owners) returns. 
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